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Use of Mental Simulations to Change Theory of Planned Behaviour Variables  
Abstract 
 
Objectives. The predictive validity of the theory of planned behaviour iswell established, 
but much less is known about: (a) whether there are causal relationships between 
key components of the model and (b) how to go about changing the theory of planned 
behaviour variables. This study tested the ability of outcome and process simulations to 
change variables specified in the theory of planned behaviour in relation to blood donation. 
Design. Participants (N ¼ 146) were randomized to one of four conditions: outcome 
simulation only, process simulation only, process-plus-outcome simulation and a 
distractor control condition. The dependent variables were state anxiety, and intention 
attitude, subjective norm and perceived control from the theory of planned behaviour. 
Methods. Participants were asked to empty their mind and visualize themselves: 
(a) after donating blood (outcome manipulation), (b) preparing to donate blood 
(process manipulation), (c) both preparing to donate blood and after having donated 
blood (process-plus-outcome manipulation) or (d) both preparing to get a high mark 
and after having got a high mark on their course (control condition). Following mental 
rehearsal, participants completed the dependent variables. 
Results. There were no main effects of outcome simulation, but process simulation 
successfully increased intention, subjective norm and perceived control. There was also a 
significant outcome simulation £ process simulation interaction for attitude. The effect of the 
process manipulation on intention was mediated by subjective norm and perceived control. 
Conclusions. The findings show promise for the use of mental simulations in 
changing cognitions and further research is required to extend the present findings to 
other health behaviours. 
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The theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991; 1998) continues to receive considerable 
research attention from psychologists interested in predicting and changing health 
behaviour. Central to the model are people’s intentions, a summary of their motivation 
to engage in a particular behaviour, which have been shown to exert causal influence on 
people’s subsequent behaviour (Webb & Sheeran, 2006). Underpinning intentions are 
attitude, subjective norm and perceived control (Ajzen, 1991). Attitudes are global 
positive or negative evaluations of behaviour that in turn develop from beliefs about the 
likely positive or negative consequences of performing a particular behaviour and the 
value that is attached to those outcomes. Subjective norms are perceptions of social 
pressure from people or social groups who are important to us (i.e. with whom we are 
motivated to comply). Perceived control is the perception of whether or not a particular 
behaviour is achievable, and is regarded by the principal proponents of the constructs as 
being synonymous with Bandura’s (1986) concept of self-efficacy, or ‘confidence in 
one’s own ability’ (see Ajzen, 1998; Bandura, 1998; but see Norman & Conner, 2006, for 
an alternative view). In sum, according to the theory of planned behaviour, people 
intend to engage in behaviours that are evaluated positively, where there is social 
pressure to do so, and if they believe the behaviour is achievable. 
 
Interest in the theory of planned behaviour stems from the idea that if the variables 
specified in the model are predictive of behavioural decisions and behaviour, they will 
provide targets for theory-based health interventions (cf. Michie & Abraham, 2004). 
To some extent, research in this area has proved very fruitful, and several meta-analyses 
attest to the predictive validity of the theory of planned behaviour in many contexts and 
across many samples (e.g. Armitage & Conner, 2001a; Conner & Armitage, 1998; Godin 
& Kok, 1996). Of particular note, Webb and Sheeran’s (2006) meta-analysis shows that 
intentions exert causal influence on behaviour. However, relatively little attention has 
been paid to the fact that although prediction can be useful, the ultimate goal is 
explanation (see Sutton, 1998). For example, attitudes have consistently been shown to 
be highly predictive of intentions, yet without also showing that attitudes explain (i.e. 
are causally related to) intentions, it is not necessarily the case that changing attitudes 
will lead to changes in intention (Sutton, 1998). In other words, the fact that attitudes 
are predictive of intentions tells us who might need to receive an intervention (i.e. those 
with negative attitudes), it does not necessarily mean that changing attitudes will bring 
about intention- or behaviour change. Moreover, such analyses do not provide any 
information about what an intervention should contain to bring about cognition and 
behaviour change. 
 
Evidence for causal relationships between theory of planned behaviour variables has 
not been forthcoming: whereas Armitage and Conner’s meta-analysis identified 185 
independent studies testing the predictive validity of the theory of planned behaviour, 
Hardeman et al.’s systematic review identified just two studies that tested causal 
relationships between theory of planned behaviour variables. Although studies have 
appeared since (e.g. Chatzisarantis & Hagger, 2005), the literature testing the 
explanatory power of the theory of planned behaviour is still dwarfed by the literature 
testing the predictive validity of the model (contrast Armitage & Conner, 2001a with 
Hardeman et al., 2002). Thus, further work investigating whether there are cause-andeffect 
relationships between components of the theory of planned behaviour is required. 
 
The question then arises as to how best to change theory of planned behaviour 
variables with an intervention. Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) advocate changing underlying 
salient beliefs, creating new salient beliefs, or making appropriate non-salient beliefs 
more salient. Consistent with this suggestion, Hardeman et al.’s (2002) review showed 
that the most common techniques for changing theory of planned behaviour variables 
were information provision (19 out of 24 interventions) and persuasion (13 out of 24 
514 interventions). However, there is still much debate concerning the best way to change 
people’s beliefs. For example, according to Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986) elaboration 
likelihood model, the most sustained attitude change should occur when strong 
arguments are targeted at people who are both sufficiently motivated to process the 
message and who are capable of processing the message. However, given that: (a) there 
is not yet a consensus as to what constitutes a ‘strong’ or a ‘weak’ argument (e.g. Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993, pp. 309–314), (b) there are no clear means of ensuring all recipients are 
motivated and capable of processing the message or (c) whether these techniques 
extend to changing the beliefs underpinning subjective norm and perceived control, it 
seems appropriate to consider other possible means of changing theory of planned 
behaviour variables. 
 
Mental simulations 
One approach that does not appear to have been tested in the context of the theory of 
planned behaviour is mental simulation. Clinicians, coaches and laboratory-based 
scientists have used mental simulations to facilitate the performance of a range of 
behaviours, and there is a growing body of evidence showing that mental simulations 
facilitate the link between thought and action (e.g. Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 
1998). Of particular relevance to the present research is a distinction made by Pham and 
Taylor (1999) between outcome simulations and process simulations (see also Taylor 
et al., 1998). Outcome simulations involve envisioning the desired outcome – someone 
wanting to lose weight might imagine how they would look having achieved the desired 
weight loss. In contrast, process simulations involve mentally simulating the process of 
achieving the goal – for the person trying to lose weight, this might involve imagining 
signing up to exercise classes, imagining removing fatty snacks from the diet and/or 
imagining increasing fruit and vegetable consumption. 
 
Pham and Taylor (1999) showed that students who used process simulations scored 
significantly higher on exams than did students using outcome simulations, and also 
showed that the process manipulation worked by increasing planning and reducing 
anxiety.1 The question then arises as to what effects outcome and process 
manipulations might have on cognitions specified in the theory of planned behaviour. 
According to Ajzen (1991), attitudes are based on beliefs about outcomes, implying that 
attitudes might be liable to change when participants are asked to envision an outcome. 
Thus, asking participants to envisage a positive outcome is likely to make their attitudes 
more positive. In contrast, evaluation of the process of attaining goal maps more closely 
on to Bandura’s (1997) work on subgoals and personal mastery, two strategies that have 
been shown to enhance perceived control. It is less clear how outcome and process 
simulations will affect subjective norm because imagined outcomes can be social in 
nature (e.g. celebrating with friends), as can be processes (e.g. going to the gym with 
friends). 
 
Target behaviour 
The target behaviour was blood donation, which is an important health behaviour for 
three main reasons. First, the supply of blood is under threat because of the apparent 
reluctance of eligible donors to donate (Linden, Gregorio, & Kalish, 1988) and the 
limited success in attracting new donors (Ferguson & Bibby, 2002). Second, several 
studies show that the theory of planned behaviour is predictive of, but does not 
necessarily cause, blood donation behavioural decisions and behaviour (e.g. Armitage & 
Conner, 2001b; Giles & Cairns, 1995; for a review see Ferguson, 1996). Third, there may 
be direct health benefits to be derived from donating blood, including reduced risk of 
cardiovascular events (e.g. Meyers et al., 1997). 
 
Rationale and hypotheses 
The research reviewed above provides the following rationale for the present paper. 
First, understanding means by which cognitions within the theory of planned behaviour 
can be changed is important in developing theory-led interventions. Second, although 
research to date suggests that mental simulations are important in changing some 
cognitions, it is not clear how they will affect theory of planned behaviour variables. It is 
predicted that: (a) consistent with Pham and Taylor (1999), the process manipulation 
will increase intention and reduce state anxiety, (b) process simulations will increase 
perceived control (cf. Bandura, 1986, 1997), (c) outcome simulations will change 
attitudes and intentions (cf. Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980), and (d) that the effects of the 
interventions on intention will be mediated by state anxiety, attitude, subjective norm 
and perceived control. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Students were approached in classrooms and asked to participate in a survey on blood 
donation. Of the 161 people who were approached, 146 (90.12%) agreed to participate. 
The 15 people who did not participate reported that they were unable to donate blood 
for medical reasons. The sample consisted of 112 women and 34 men aged between 17 
and 35 (M = 19.31, SD = 2.22). The University ethics committee approved the 
research. 
 
Design and procedure 
A 2 x 2 between-participants design was used. The independent variables were 
outcome manipulation (received vs. did not receive) and process manipulation 
(received vs. did not receive). The four conditions were therefore: outcome 
manipulation only, process manipulation only, process manipulation plus outcome 
manipulation, and a control condition who received neither manipulation but engaged 
in a distractor task. 
 
Pham and Taylor (1999) conducted their study on participants as individuals or in 
groups of up to three, which raises two potential difficulties. First, under such circumstances, 
it is not possible for the researcher to be completely blind to condition, 
which raises the possibility that experimenter expectancy effects may have 
contaminated Pham and Taylor’s (1999) findings. Second, we were interested in 
developing an intervention that could work on a broad scale and one-to-one 
interventions are costly to implement. Therefore, we sorted the experimental materials 
into random order using a web-based randomizer and delivered them to participants as 
they sat in classrooms. Participants were asked to complete the intervention and 
questionnaire in silence under exam conditions. The researcher was therefore blind to 
the conditions. 
 Manipulations 
The manipulations were almost identical to those used by Pham and Taylor (1999) with 
minimal adaptations being made to frame the manipulations with respect to blood 
donation. To minimize experimenter involvement, all instructions associated with the 
manipulations were written on the first page of the questionnaire. On the second page 
of the questionnaire, participants received one of four paragraphs, depending on 
whether they had been randomly allocated to the outcome manipulation only, process 
manipulation only, process-plus-outcome manipulations or control (distractor) 
condition. They were instructed to read the paragraph, rehearse it with their eyes 
closed and then write down any thoughts in the space provided. 
 
Each paragraph instructed the participant to empty their mind and visualize 
themselves: (a) after donating blood (outcome manipulation), (b) preparing to donate 
blood (process manipulation), (c) both preparing to donate blood and after having 
donated blood (process-plus-outcome manipulation) or (d) both preparing to get a high 
mark and after having got a high mark on their course (control condition). Each 
paragraph also gave participants examples of the kinds of things they might visualize, 
such as a sense of well being and feeling of elation (outcome manipulation), or arranging 
to go with friends and how you might get to the venue (process manipulation). 
Following these paragraphs, participants were instructed to close their eyes and 
rehearse the paragraph in their mind until the researcher asked them to stop. 
Participants were allowed 2 minutes from the beginning of the study to read these 
instructions and complete the visualization task. Participants then completed the 
dependent measures described in the following section. 
 Measures 
State anxiety 
State anxiety was measured using Marteau and Bekker’s (1992) short form of the 
Spielberger state-trait anxiety inventory. The measure consists of six items that 
participants rated on 4-point scale labelled not at all, somewhat, moderately and very 
much. The items are: ‘I feel calm’ (reverse-scored), ‘I am tense’, ‘I feel upset’, ‘I am 
relaxed’ (reverse-scored), ‘I feel content’ (reverse-scored) and ‘I am worried’. Cronbach’s 
α indicated that the state anxiety scale possessed good internal reliability, α=0.85. 
 
Theory of planned behaviour 
For the measure of attitude, participants were presented with the stem: ‘My donating 
blood in the next month is/would be …. ’, which was rated on five 7-point bipolar 
(-3 to +3) semantic differential scales, useless–useful, foolish–wise, unsafe–safe, harmful–
beneficial and unhealthy–healthy. Cronbach’s a indicated that the attitude 
scale possessed good internal reliability (α=0.91). Subjective norm was operationalized 
with two items, which participants rated on 7-point unipolar (1–7) scales: ‘People who 
are important to me think I: should not donate blood in the next month–should donate 
blood in the next month’ and ‘People who are important to me would: disapprove of 
my donating blood in the next month–approve of my donating blood in the next 
month’. Cronbach’s α for the subjective norm scale was .76, indicating good internal 
reliability. Perceived control was measured by averaging responses to three items 
measured on 7-point unipolar (1–7) scales: ‘I believe I have the ability to donate blood in 
the next month definitely do not–definitely do’, ‘My donating blood in the next month 
is/would be ….. difficult–easy’ and ‘How confident are you that you will be able to 
donate blood in the next month? not very confident–very confident’. Cronbach’s α was 
.84. Behavioural intention was measured with two items on 7-point bipolar (-3 to +3) 
scales: ‘I intend to donate blood in the next month definitely do not–definitely do’ and 
‘How likely is it that you will donate blood in the next month?,  very unlikely–very 
likely’. Cronbach’s α indicated that the behavioural intention scale possessed good 
internal reliability, α= 0.95. 
 
Results 
Randomization check 
The success of the randomization procedure was verified using ANOVA and chi-squared. 
Outcome manipulation with two levels (received vs. did not receive) and process 
manipulation (received vs. did not receive) were the independent variables and age 
was the dependent variable. These analyses revealed no differences in age between 
those who received the outcome manipulation and those who did not, 
F(1, 146) = 0.13, p = .71, p
2
 < .01, and no difference between those who received 
the process manipulation and those who did not, F(1, 146) = 0.10, p = .75, p
2
 < .01 
The outcome manipulation £ process manipulation interaction was also nonsignificant, 
F(1, 146) = 0.04, p = .85, p
2
 < .01. Comparable analyses were carried 
out using chi-squared tests to see whether there were differences in gender across the 
conditions. No significant differences were found, 2s(1) = 0.14 to 1.13, ps > .28. 
Randomization was therefore deemed successful. 
 
Effects of the manipulations 
The effects of the manipulations were tested using MANOVA. Outcome manipulation with 
two levels (received versus did not receive) and process manipulation (received versus did 
not receive) were the independent variables, anxiety and theory of planned behaviour 
variables were the dependent variables.  The data presented in Table 1 show no significant 
main effects for the outcome manipulation on any dependent variable, F(5, 138) = 0.99, p = 
.43 p
2
 = .03.  In contrast, there were significant main effects of the process manipulation on 
anxiety, subjective norm, perceived control and intention, Fs(1, 146) = 5.15 to 7.37, ps < .05, 
p
2
s > .04 (Table 1).  The pattern of means reveals that the process manipulation decreased 
anxiety and increased subjective norm, perceived control and intention.  
 Although the multivariate test showed no significant outcome manipulation x process 
manipulation interaction, F(5, 138) = 1.90, p = .10, the effect size associated with this test 
(p
2
 = .06) warranted further investigation.  Univariate tests of the outcome manipulation x 
process manipulation interaction revealed one significant effect, for attitude, F(1, 146) = 
4.79, p < .05, p
2
 = .03 (Table 1).  The nature of the interaction was probed using Tukey HSD 
post-hoc tests, which revealed that attitudes in the process condition were significantly higher 
than attitudes in the control condition (p < .05). Note, however, that this finding should 
be interpreted with caution, given that the effect size is small-to-medium (Cohen, 1988) 
and could represent a Type 1 error. 
 
Mediator effects 
Mediational analyses were conducted to test whether changes in cognition mediated the 
effects of the intervention on intention. The process manipulation was dummy-coded to 
create an independent variable and intention was used as the dependent variable. State 
anxiety and the remaining theory of planned behaviour variables served as potential 
mediators, which were tested using Preacher and Hayes’ bootstrapping method for 
multiple mediator effects (Figure 1). Testing multiple mediators simultaneously is 
preferable to conducting a series of independent regression analyses because multiple 
independent regression analyses lack the power to detect significant indirect effects 
(MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman,West, & Sheets, 2002). The basis for these analyses is 
that the indirect effect of condition on intention is the product of the paths between 
condition and mediator (i.e. state anxiety, attitude, subjective norm and perceived 
control), and between mediator and intention. However, such indirect effects are not 
normally distributed, meaning that Sobel tests can be suspect (particularly in smaller 
samples) meaning that bootstrapping is necessary (Preacher & Hayes, 2007). This 
involves resampling random subsets of data in order to gain a non-parametric 
approximation of the sampling distribution of the product of the condition-mediator 
and mediator-intention paths. The analyses presented here are based on 5,000 
resamples, although repeating the analyses with more resamples made no difference to 
the findings. These analyses revealed that both subjective norm (95% CI = .01, estimate =.33) 
and perceived control (95% CI = .12, estimate = 1.09) significantly 
(ps < .05) mediated the effect of the process manipulation on intention (Figure 1), 
although perceived control was the dominant mediator. The final model accounted for 
63% of the variance in intention, F(5, 140) = 47.63, p < .01. 
 
Discussion 
The present study used mental simulations to try and increase people’s intentions to 
donate blood. There was mixed support for the hypotheses because although process 
simulations affected mood and cognition, outcome simulations did not affect mood or 
cognition. Nevertheless, there were three key findings. First, the process manipulation 
was successful in increasing intentions. Second, the process manipulation reduced 
participants’ state anxiety and increased attitudes, subjective norm and perceived 
control. Third, the effects of the process manipulation on intention were mediated by 
subjective norm and perceived control. The following discussion focuses on the 
practical and theoretical implications of these findings. 
The present findings are strikingly similar to those reported by Pham and 
Taylor (1999) insofar as process simulations, but not outcome simulations, affected 
the dependent variables. Thus, process simulations could represent a key means 
by which to change health behaviour. Moreover, it is notable that the process 
simulation manipulation was self-directed, worked even though participants were 
tested in large groups, and was shown to be independent of the experimenter 
expectancy effects that may have contaminated Pham and Taylor’s (1999) findings. 
The implication is that there is scope for delivering interventions via means of 
process simulations on a much larger scale. That said, it would be valuable to know 
whether being delivered one-to-one in consultation with a health professional 
can enhance the effectiveness of process simulation manipulations, given that 
the process manipulation was associated with a small-to-medium effect size 
(Cohen, 1988). 
The mediational analyses were consistent with the idea that the process simulation 
exerted its effects via perceived control and subjective norm, although perceived 
control was the principal mediator. Given that perceived control is regarded as being 
synonymous with self-efficacy (e.g. Ajzen, 1998), these findings can readily be 
interpreted as further evidence to show that creating subgoals and having personal 
mastery experiences are important in increasing perceived control (e.g. Bandura, 1997). 
Moreover, this finding maps on to Armitage and Conner’s (1999) study that found 
perceived control was the only theory of planned behaviour variable that showed 
evidence of a cause-and-effect relationship with intention. 
In contrast, asking people to make outcome simulations had null effects on theory of 
planned behaviour variables. However, it is worth noting that outcome simulations are 
most likely to work by making currently appropriate non-salient beliefs more salient; it is 
less likely that outcome simulations would make new appropriate beliefs salient and 
they are not designed to change existing beliefs (cf. Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). Thus, 
further work is required to test alternative means of changing attitudes by manipulating 
outcome beliefs. 
We initially argued that either outcome simulations or process simulations might 
affect subjective norm because outcomes and processes can both be social in nature 
(e.g. celebrating success with friends vs. making plans to go to the venue with friends). 
However, the present findings showed that only the process manipulation affected 
subjective norm, raising the possibility that it might be easier to visualize social pressure 
to engage in instrumental acts (e.g. gaining social support, travelling to the location, 
waiting with friends) rather than social pressure associated with outcomes. Further 
work is required to investigate the impact of process and outcome simulations on 
subjective norms. 
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In contrast with Pham and Taylor (1999), the present effects were not mediated by 
state anxiety, meaning that state anxiety is more predictive of exam performance than 
blood donation. This might have important implications for designing interventions to 
promote blood donation, because although it is widely assumed that state anxiety is at 
the root of people’s failure to donate blood, research actually suggests an indirect link 
between predonation state anxiety and subsequent donation (e.g. Ditto & France, 
2006). Indeed, Ferguson and Bibby (2002) have shown that, at least for occasional 
(four or fewer previous blood donations) blood donors, intentions are very good 
predictors of subsequent behaviour. Nevertheless, the process simulation exercise was 
associated with lower state anxiety, and it would be valuable to see whether these 
effects could be sustained more long term, or at least be used by people suffering 
anxiety in health-related decision-making contexts. 
Limitations 
Although the present study takes the theory of planned behaviour literature forward in 
some important respects, it is important to highlight some potential difficulties that 
should be addressed in future research. First, the principal outcome measure was 
intention rather than behaviour. Although there was a good practical reason for doing 
this, namely, that the low absolute rate of blood donation means thousands of 
participants would have been needed to demonstrate a significant effect (cf. Ferguson & 
Bibby, 2002; Linden et al., 1988), it would be valuable to test the effectiveness of the 
manipulations on behaviour. That said, Pham and Taylor (1999) showed that a process 
manipulation affected an objectively verifiable outcome measure andWebb and Sheeran 
provide compelling evidence to suggest there is a causal relationship between intention 
and behaviour (Webb & Sheeran, 2006), meaning we are cautiously optimistic about the 
effects carrying forward to behaviour. Second, the present sample consisted of students 
and so caution must be adopted if attempting to generalize the present sample to 
the broader populations. Nevertheless, given that many students donate blood 
(e.g. Wiwanitkit, 2002), they still represent a valid population at which to target 
interventions. A third possible limitation was that, due to a desire to minimize the 
burden placed on participants, we chose to limit the number of dependent variables 
that were assessed. This meant that salient beliefs were not measured directly, and that 
only their presumed effects on attitude, subjective norm and perceived control were 
assessed. It would be valuable in future research to see whether the effects of process 
simulation manipulations exert their effects via control beliefs. Alternatively, future 
work might usefully interview participants to establish precisely how participants 
interpreted the manipulations. 
Conclusions 
The present study represents the first attempt to use mental simulations to change 
the theory of planned behaviour variables. The key findings were that process – but 
not outcome – simulations were effective in changing intentions, and that these 
effects were mediated by perceived control and subjective norm. Further research is 
required to establish whether these effects generalize beyond the present context 
and sample and, more broadly, to identify additional manipulations that might usefully 
be transplanted from the laboratory to the field (cf. Armitage, 2007; Armitage, Harris, 
Hepton, & Napper, 2008). 
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Footnote 1 
 
Note that Pham and Taylor (1999) report the mental simulations did not affect intention or 
perceived control. However, it should be emphasised that Pham and Taylor (1999) did not set 
out to test the theory of planned behaviour and so operationalised intention and perceived 
control differently to that typically found in the theory of planned behaviour literature. 
More specifically, while Pham and Taylor’s (1999) mental simulations focused on attaining 
high marks in a set of exams, the intention and perceived control measures were framed in 
terms of making the requisite effort, working hard, and coping with the demands of the exam 
(perceived control), and with when they would start studying (intention). In other words, the 
measures of perceived control and intention were only indirectly related to the mental  
simulation manipulation, which asked students to think about getting a high grade on their 
exams. Had the measures been: ‘How confident are you that you will gain a high mark’ 
(perceived control) or ‘Do you intend to gain a high mark?’, the effects of the simulations 
might well have exerted significant effects. Indeed, Pham and Taylor’s (1999) measure of 
planning seems closer to the accepted measurement of intention from a theory of planned 
behaviour perspective. It is also notable that Pham and Taylor’s (1999) outcome simulation 
manipulation did not have an effect on cognition or behaviour-one possibility is that it failed 
to change attitudes. 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Means (Standard Deviations) Showing Differences Between Conditions 
 Manipulations     
Dependent Variables Control  
(n = 39) 
Outcome  
(n = 37) 
Process  
(n = 36) 
Combined 
(n = 34) 
Foutcome 
df = 1, 146 
Fprocess 
df = 1, 146 
Finteraction 
df = 1, 146 
p
2
 
Anxiety  2.03  
(0.50) 
 2.09  
(0.74) 
1.88  
(0.69) 
 1.68  
(0.49) 
0.49     7.37** 1.66 .05 
Attitude  1.06 
(1.77) 
 1.39 
(1.21) 
 1.93 
(0.97) 
 1.23 
(1.57) 
0.57 2.28   4.79* .03 
Subjective Norm  4.41  
(1.61) 
 4.78  
(1.02) 
5.12  
(1.21) 
 5.09  
(1.49) 
0.56   5.15* 0.83 .04 
Perceived Control  3.81  
(1.76) 
 4.13  
(1.76) 
5.05  
(1.79) 
 4.32  
(1.90) 
0.47   5.76* 3.02 .04 
Intention -0.67  
(1.93) 
-0.51  
(1.95) 
0.65  
(2.28) 
-0.59  
(2.16) 
0.66   6.63* 1.57 .05 
Note. The p
2
 values refer to statistically significant effects only. According to Cohen (1988), p
2
 = .01 is a ‘small’ effect size, p
2
 = .09 is a 
‘medium’ effect size and p
2
 .25 is a ‘large’ effect size. 
*p , :01; **p , :05.
Figure 1 
Mediating Effects of the Process Manipulation on Intention 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note.  Path coefficients are unstandardized betas (B).  Tests of statistical significance are 
based on t-tests. Dotted lines indicate non-significant paths. The value in parenthesis 
indicates the strength in the path prior to the inclusion of the mediating variables. 
*p < .05.  **p < .01.  
 
 
Anxiety 
Attitude 
Subjective Norm 
Perceived Control 
Intention 
Process 
Manipulation (.90**) .20 
.02 
.08 .37 
.24* 
-.27** 
.52* 
.73* .83** 
